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Recent insider trading cases reveal a stark conceptual divide between the federal
courts and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding
liability for securities fraud in cases in which an insider (a “tipper”) gives
material non-public information to a market professional or close friend or other
potential trader (a “tippee”). Following the landmark Supreme Court case
called Dirks v. SEC, the federal courts do not impose liability on tippers or
tippees unless there the tipper receives a consequential personal benefit or is a
close friend or relative of the tippee. The SEC abjures this "personal benefit"
requirement, and would define the concept of personal benefit so broadly as to
remove it as an impediment to insider trading prosecutions.
This Article explains the economic function of the personal benefit test as
establishing the criterion upon which legitimate trading on the basis of material
non-public information can be distinguished from venal or corrupt trading. The
Article shows that the personal benefit test, while a valuable innovation to
insider trading jurisprudence, is severely limited because it does not capture all
of the various motivations that cause insiders to convey material non-public
information to traders. This Article fills that gap by providing a complete
taxonomy of tipping and trading, and explaining the legal consequences of all of
the various forms of insider trading.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a lot of confusion about the permissibility of insider trading1
because regulators lack a complete understanding of the legitimate, noncorrupt reasons that insiders regularly reveal material non-public information
to Wall Street market professionals such as traders at hedge funds and investment banks. This incomplete understanding of why people tip is accompanied
by a concomitant lack of understanding about the role that tipping plays in
stock markets and reveals a core disagreement between the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the federal courts about whether the law
should prohibit all or only certain forms of trading by those with an acute
informational advantage over their counter-parties.
1

In this Article, I use the term “insider trading” to mean the trading on the basis of an informational advantage (an informational asymmetry between purchasers and sellers) that occurs
when one party trades on the basis of material non-public information that is neither reflected
in the market price of the security being traded, nor available to the insider’s counter-party prior
to the trade. Of course insiders such as corporate officers or lawyers and investment bankers
who have regular access to material non-public information sometimes trade only after such
information is disclosed. Such trading is not controversial and this Article does not consider
such trading.
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Specifically, the confused state of the law results from the fact that we
lack a complete account of the economic effects of tipping. The existing test
for determining liability in tipping cases, the personal benefit test invented by
Justice Powell in Dirks v. SEC,2 is a brilliant innovation.3 The point of the test
is to distinguish when trading on the basis of tips from insiders is beneficial
and should be permitted, versus when such trading is harmful to markets and
should be banned.
But like many prototypes, it is somewhat crude. The Dirks test is crude
because it divides tippers into two stark categories: those who receive a
personal benefit in exchange for their tip and those who do not.4 Those who
receive a benefit when they tip have broken the law, while those who receive
no benefit have not. The goal of this Article is to offer a more nuanced approach
to tipping that better tracks the various reasons why tipping actually occurs in
trading markets and more accurately sorts permissible from impermissible
insider trading.
This Article begins by briefly recounting the fundamental disagreement
between the SEC and the courts about the role that insider trading law plays in
capital markets. The SEC takes the view that the purpose of the law is to
alleviate asymmetries in information between trading parties in order to
promote “fairness,” which the SEC equates with parity of information among
traders.5 The Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly rejected the SEC’s
fairness approach to insider trading law. The Court’s interpretation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346—the anti-fraud provision of the
Exchange Act—is not designed to promote fairness among strangers who trade
2

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
See generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 64 (2016) (arguing that the personal benefit test, and insider trading law more generally,
is clear and sensible, and that any arguments to the contrary stem from inconsistencies among the
executive branch and the judiciary—not between the federal courts themselves).
4
See Dirks v. SEC, 462 U.S. 646, 663 (“To determine whether a disclosure itself deceives,
manipulates, or defrauds shareholders, the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of
duty by the insider. This requires courts to focus on . . . whether the insider receives a direct or
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit
that will translate into future earnings.” (citation and quotations omitted)).
5
See e.g. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 35 & n.133 (1984) (finding that the SEC in
Dirks harkened back to a “bygone fairness era”)
6
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp
(2006)). The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5, pursuant to the authority delegated to it in §10(b). 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)
(“Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission has adopted Rule 10b–5”).
3
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in anonymous markets. Rather, it is designed to police trading by insiders, as
well as the interactions of insiders and Wall Street traders, and to regulate the
improper use of proprietary corporate information.7
Because the SEC views any sort of trading on the basis of an informational advantage as unfair, it would ban all such trading. For the SEC, the
motivation of a tipper is irrelevant because all tipping is bad given that it enables
trading on the basis of an informational advantage over one’s counter-party.8 In
sharp contrast, the Court’s view is that only tipping that reflects a breach of a
tipper’s pre-existing duties of trust and confidence is problematic.9
The difference between the SEC’s approach and that of the Supreme
Court could not be more profound. Because the SEC views trading on the basis
of any sort of informational advantage as wrongful, the Commission regards all
trading on the basis of tipping by an insider as wrongful and deleterious to the
functioning of capital markets.10 In stark contrast, while the Court condemns
trading on the basis of tips in certain contexts, it views such insider trading as
highly salutary to the proper functioning of capital markets in other contexts.11
Because the Court’s personal benefit test12 is designed to sort useful
(efficient) insider trading from harmful (inefficient) insider trading, the test has
no value to the SEC, because the SEC denies the underlying distinction on
which the personal benefit test is based. From the SEC’s perspective, no sorting
is required—and hence no sorting test is needed—because all trading by
7

Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions
or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 106 (2009).
8
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651 (“The SEC concluded: Where tipees - regardless of
their motivation or occupation - come into possession of material corporate information that
they know is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider, they must
either publicly disclose that information or refrain from training” (emphasis added) (citation
and internal quotations omitted)).
9
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222,
232 (“[T]here can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information ‘was not [the corporation’s] agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person
in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.’”).
10
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (“The SEC's position . . . is that a tippee 'inherits' the
. . . obligation to shareholders whenever he receives inside information from an insider” .)
11
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 242-43 (providing a list of examples and
concluding that, "[i]n each of these instances, trading is accomplished on the basis of
material, nonpublic information, but the information has not been unlawfully converted for
personal gain."); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646, (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely
because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and
trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC
itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”).
12
See supra note 4.
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insiders on the basis of tips is harmful because all such trading is based on an
informational advantage that the SEC views as fundamentally unfair. Thus it
is not surprising that the SEC dislikes the personal benefit test and has tried for
decades to undermine it in every way that it can.13
After an Introduction and describing the role played by the personal
benefit test in Part II,14 the third Part of the Article articulates a taxonomy of
tipping that indicates the different contexts in which tipping by insiders occurs,
and describes the social welfare gains and losses associated with insider trading
on the basis of tips of material non-public information in each of these
contexts.15 Part IV synthesizes the analysis in Part III by contrasting how
tipping and trading is viewed from a legal perspective by the SEC, and the
federal courts.16 Part IV also shows how the law of insider trading would
change if the efficiency-oriented analysis proposed in this Article were to be
implemented. A conclusion follows.17
The goal of this Article is to show that the personal benefit test requires
tweaking and to suggest appropriate revisions. As it stands, the personal benefit
test is simultaneously under and over inclusive, legalizing some trading that
13

Macey, supra note 3, at 65-66 (noting the various ways in which the SEC has attempted
to regulate the trading of information). For example, in a direct response to Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the SEC promulgated Rule 14(e)(3), which eliminates
the Supreme Court’s requirement of a personal benefit in insider trading cases involving
tender offers on the basis of special SEC authority to regulate tender offers. 17 C.F.R.
240.14e-3 (1981). Likewise, the SEC promulgated Regulation FD, which purports to
eliminate the very selective disclosure that the Supreme Court approved in Dirks. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 243.100-243.103 (2011). Regulation FD prohibits U.S. public companies from making
selective, non-public disclosures to analysts. Id. A concern with the rule is that it might lead
to fewer disclosures and lower quality of analyst forecasts, and thus diminish the quality and
efficiency of the capital markets. See Armando Gomes, Gary Gorton and Leonardo
Madureira, SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information and the Cost of Capital, 13 J.
CORP. FIN. 300, 300 (2007) (demonstrating that Regulation FD caused a significant shift in
analyst attention away from small firms). The SEC also adopted litigation stances in
Chiarella and Dirks that rejected the Supreme Court’s long-held view that tipping should be
decriminalized in certain contexts. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (declining to apply “such a
new and different theory of liability” that the appellate court had invoked to affirm
the conviction and rejecting the SEC’s alternative theory in support of liability “that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon information that
he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation”); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 (asserting that the SEC’s litigation position in the case
“differs little from the view that [the Supreme Court] rejected as inconsistent with
congressional intent in Chiarella”).
14
See Part II, infra at 42-54.
15
See Part III, infra at 54-78.
16
See Part IV, infra at 79-81.
17
See Part V, infra at 81-83.
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should be banned and penalizing other trading that should be rewarded. The
test is under-inclusive in that some people who provide tips to insiders should
be prohibited from doing so even if they do not receive a personal benefit for
their tips. The test is over-inclusive because certain trading can be socially
beneficial in spite of the fact that the insider providing the tip has received a
personal benefit from a trader in exchange for the tip.
A more complete taxonomy of the nature of tipping is important for
normative reasons. On the one hand, if there were no venal reasons for tipping,
then it would make sense to permit all tipping. But it is trivially easy to show
that there are plenty of venal reasons for tipping. On the other hand, it would
also be an oversimplification to label all tipping as stemming from venality, and
ban tipping in its entirety. Creating a more complete taxonomy, however, does
not completely solve the analytical problem. Having created that taxonomy, one
must then examine the various contexts in which tipping occurs and determine
the contexts in which it should be banned, the contexts in which it should be
grudgingly tolerated, and the contexts in which it should be encouraged.
If there were no salutary reasons for insiders to provide tips of material,
non-public information, then it would make sense to ban all such tipping.
Because it turns out that, as a descriptive matter, tipping by insiders that then
leads to trading can sometimes be benign as well as nefarious, some sort of rule
is needed to distinguish between these two possibilities so that benign tipping
is allowed or even encouraged while nefarious tipping is prohibited and
sanctioned. The vast confusion in insider trading law reflects the inability of
the current legal landscape to grapple with the various subjective contexts in
which insider trading can occur. Through its tipping taxonomy, this Article
strives to establish scaffolding upon which a more context-specific legal
treatment for insider trading can be built.
I. DIRKS V. SEC: THE INVENTION OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST
The landmark case of Dirks v. SEC18 shows the stark difference between the Supreme Court’s approach to insider trading and the SEC’s approach
to such trading. The fact pattern depicts one of several contexts in which the
SEC would have banned insider trading, while the Court indicated that such
trading should not merely be tolerated but actively encouraged.
In 1973, the SEC sued and censured Raymond Dirks, a securities
analyst who specialized in evaluating publicly traded insurance companies,
for tipping The Wall Street Journal and some of his firm’s trading clients
about a massive fraud that he had uncovered at the insurance company Equity
18

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Funding.19 The prosecution of Mr. Dirks reflected the delivery on a promise
that then-SEC Chair John Shad had made while decrying the fact that insider
trading was perceived as widespread and expressing his concern that such
trading had undermined investor confidence in the capital markets.20 In his
remarks, Chairman Shad promised that the SEC would “come down with
hobnail boots to give some shocking examples to inhibit the activity.”21
Similarly, then-Director of Enforcement at the SEC John Fedders described
insider trading as “stealing by people in white shirts and suspenders.”22
Unmoved by the fact that Dirks had played a major role in uncovering
the fraud at Equity Funding, the SEC maintained that Dirks had committed
securities fraud because his tips enabled trading on the basis of material nonpublic information before such information was disclosed to the public.23 The
Supreme Court rejected the SEC’s decision to take enforcement action against
Dirks and admonished the Commission for ignoring its prior ruling in
Chiarella v. United States.24 The Court reiterated that it is only illegal to trade
on inside information when such trading is done in breach of a pre-existing
fiduciary-like obligation of trust and confidence to the source of the
information.25 In Dirks, the Supreme Court again explicitly rejected the SEC’s
view that anyone who received non-public information from a corporate
insider automatically “inherited” the insider’s legal obligation to either make
the information public or abstain from trading.26 Rather, the Court clarified that
liability for trading on the basis of tips from insiders depends on whether the
insider-tipper breached a fiduciary duty when she provided the tip.27
19

Linda Greenhouse, Dirks Gets His Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1983),
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/22/business/dirks-gets-his-day-in-court.html.
20
Fair to All People: The SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, SEC HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_c.php (last visited Sept.
3, 2016).
21
Kenneth B. Noble, S.E.C. Chief Plans Insider Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1981,
at D1.
22
Illegal Insider Trading Seems to Be on Rise; Ethics Issues Muddled, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,
1984, at 1.
23
Fair to All People, supra note 7.
24
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
25
463 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1983) (characterizing the SEC’s stance as “differ[ing] little from
the view that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella,” and that
“conflicts with the principle set forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some
circumstances, will be barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic
information”).
26
Fair to All People, supra note 7.
27
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664.
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A. The SEC vs. the Courts: Fairness or Efficiency? A Philosophical
Impasse
The disagreement between the SEC and the courts on insider trading
doctrine is based on a firm and irreconcilable difference about the root
justification for regulating insider trading. The SEC, firmly embedded in its
bureaucratic role of protecting the securities markets, rejects the premise that
material non-public information is a form of intellectual property. Accordingly,
the SEC also rejects the idea that socially desirable trading based on such
information is possible. As such, the SEC does not countenance any trading on
the basis of informational asymmetries, even that which is done to glean the
rewards of costly and socially desirable research into fundamental company
values or to reveal an ongoing corporate fraud. Rejecting the view that trading
can at least potentially advance a number of valuable social goals, the SEC is of
the view that anyone in possession of material non-public information should
be forbidden to use it at all, ever.28 Only after the relevant information on which
the trading is based has been public can it be used, according to the SEC.29
The SEC’s view is that insider trading must be prohibited because it is
unfair to the trader’s counter-party. As a consequence of this view, the SEC
believes that those “who possess material non-public information, must
disclose it before trading or abstain from trading until the information is
publicly disseminated.”30 The fairness approach presupposes that trading on
the basis of material non-public information “operates as a fraud [sic] all other
buyers and sellers in the market.”31
In contrast, the Court, abjuring conclusory, unspecified notions of
“fairness” and embracing empirically verifiable concepts such as property
rights and efficiency, rejects the SEC’s equal treatment philosophy and its
concomitant “disclose or abstain” doctrine. The Court’s 1980 decision in
Chiarella v. U.S.32 was the watershed opinion that rejected the SEC’s fairness
approach and embraced a property rights approach that focused on the
allocation of rights to trading that are created by employment contracts and
other agreements creating relationships of trust and confidence between the
28

In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also Thomas C. Newkirk, Associate
Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Speech at 16th International Symposium on Economic
Crime (Sept. 19, 1998) (citing Cady, Roberts), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech
archive/1998/spch221.htm.
29
Id.
30
Fair to All People, supra note 7.
31
Newkirk, supra note 14 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
in which the court had adopted the SEC’s reasoning in Cady, Roberts).
32
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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companies that create information and the people to whom such information
must be entrusted.33 Three years later, Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel were
the first formally to conceptualize insider trading law as seeking to establish
the efficient allocation of property rights in information.”34
The practical differences between the SEC’s fairness approach and the
Court’s property rights approach are significant. For example, a trader in
possession of inside information can satisfy the SEC’s demand for fairness
simply by publicly disclosing the information in her possession (or directly to
her counter-party if the transaction will not occur on a registered stock
exchange or Alternative Trading System, such as a dark pool).35 Suppose, for
example, that a lawyer in a large law firm came into possession of the material
non-public information that one of her firm’s clients was about to make a bid
to purchase all of the shares of a large publicly traded company at a substantial
premium over that company’s current market price. Suppose further that the
lawyer, seeing a great profit-making opportunity, bought shares in the target
company before the client made its bid, and made a tidy profit selling the newly
acquired shares to her client. The SEC would view the lawyer’s trading as
illegal because of the unfairness to the selling shareholders who lacked the
critical information upon which the lawyer’s purchases were predicated. The
lawyer would not have violated the insider trading prohibitions, under the
SEC’s fairness test if she had erased her unfair advantage over her counterparties by disclosing the information about the bid publicly before buying
shares in the target company.
The Court would view the issue presented by the lawyer’s trading on
material non-public information entirely differently. For the Court, the lawyer’s
legal problems arise not from the unfairness to the purchasing lawyer’s counterparty, but from the breach of the obligation of trust and confidence to her firm’s
client that was reflected in her pre-bid purchases.
Starting with the premise that the client necessarily had to invest significant resources in identifying the target company, researching the arbitrage
opportunities associated with determining that the target was undervalued due
to its poor management or its inability to avail itself of possible synergies by
33

Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
34
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 866-72 (1983); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY. INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS,
POLITICS, AND POLICY 4 (1991) (“[T)he debate about insider trading is really a debate about
how to allocate a property right within a firm.”).
35
See 17 C.F.R. 242.300(a) (defining “alternative trading system” as an organization or system
that “constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together
purchasers and sellers of securities . . . and [t]hat does not . . . [s]et rules governing the conduct
of subscribers . . . or [d]iscipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading”).
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combining with another company, the Court’s efficiency approach sees the
harm done not to the trader’s counter-party, who lacked any relationship with
the trading lawyer, but to the bidding client. In other words, eschewing the
SEC’s fairness approach, the Court’s efficiency approach seeks to protect the
bidding firm’s property rights in the information that the target company is
undervalued, thereby presenting an arbitrage opportunity in the market for
corporate control. From an efficiency standpoint, the harm caused by the
insider’s buying in advance of her client’s bid is twofold. First the purchasing
risks driving up the price of the target company’s shares, thereby damaging the
client by increasing the costs of its acquisition of the target. Second, the
purchasing might attract the interest of market professionals, who are experts
at “decoding” the signals sent by the insider’s purchases, and who might well
be able to determine that a bid for all of the shares of the target company is
imminent.36 If this happened, the price of the target company’s stock could rise
to such a high price that the arbitrage gains anticipated by the bidder would
evaporate and the takeover would no longer be economically viable for the
bidder. Damages in such a case would be in the billions.
Applying this approach it is easy to see that the SEC’s “disclose to the
market or abstain from trading” doctrine is not only unhelpful in protecting the
property rights of the bidder, it is extremely counter-productive because it would
entirely undermine the bidder’s efforts to keep the information confidential.
Protecting the bidder’s property rights in information requires that the lawyer not
only abstain from trading, but also refrain entirely from disclosing the information, and that is what the Court mandates in Chiarella and Dirks.
Basic issues such as standing to sue, damages calculations, and
substantive legal requirements differ dramatically under the fairness approach
and the efficiency approach. Under the SEC’s fairness approach, logic requires
that the shareholders in the target company who sold while the insider/lawyer
was buying should have standing to sue because they were the group that was
treated unfairly by the insider’s buying. In contrast, from an efficiency
perspective, the party damaged and whose financial interests are protected by
the insider trading law is the lawyer’s client, who risks losing the capacity to
profit from its costly search in locating and evaluating the target company. In
addition, failures to protect the bidder’s property rights in information about
36

See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Signaling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases,
and Equity Issues, 15 FIN. MGMT. 27, 41 n.18 (1986) (noting that traders routinely lower the
price they are willing to pay when buying from sellers whom they suspect possess superior
information, and raise their reservation price when selling to investors who may have
superior information); Myron Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price
Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179, 200 (1972)
(asserting that sophisticated market participants can decode the signals contained in trades
by informed investors).

Vol. 2:1]

Beyond the Personal Benefit Test

35

the target also are inefficient in a broader sense because the economy as a
whole improves when the target company’s assets are reallocated to the bidder,
who clearly values them more highly as evidenced by its willingness to pay a
premium to acquire control of such assets. These broad efficiency gains are
reflected in the premium that all of the target company’s shareholders obtain
when the bid is made, as well as the gains to the bidding company’s
shareholders if the target company’s performance improves sufficiently (or
synergies between the target and bidder are realized) after the takeover.
With respect to damages, under the fairness approach favored by the
SEC, the damages caused by the above insider trading scenario are measured
by the difference between the price at which the target company’s shareholders
sold their shares to the insider/lawyer and the price they would have received
if they had been in possession of the same information about the impending
takeover bid the insider/purchaser possessed. In contrast, under the efficiency
approach, the private measure of damages would be the increase in the cost of
acquiring the target caused by the increase in the target company’s share price
linked to the insider’s purchases, the decrease in the number of shares that the
bidder could acquire, and even the lost value of the deal if the insider trading
resulted in the bidder having to withdraw its bid. As noted above, the
substantive legal requirements imposed by the securities laws under the SEC’s
approach are satisfied merely by disclosure of the material non-public
information. Under the efficiency approach, the law imposes the more rigorous
obligation of confidentiality and abstention from trading.
From an economic point of view, judicial decisions have caused insider
trading law to evolve from an amorphous concept that attempted to achieve the
vague and (as will be shown below) unattainable objective of somehow making
trading markets “fair” into a meaningful tool for controlling agency costs
within a firm.37 Trading by agents of the firm, whether they are actually
employees of the company or “temporary insiders”38 such as the attorney
James O’Hagan, the defendant in United States v. O’Hagan, or the financial
37

From an economic perspective, shareholders, like other participants in the corporate
enterprise such as creditors and employees, define their relationship with the firm in
contractual terms. Indeed, the very existence and survival of the corporate form of business
organization can be explained by the gains associated with dividing the management and
risk-bearing attributes of ownership into separate components through incorporation. See
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291-93 (1980).
38
This concept of a “temporary insider” derives from a footnote in the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Dirks v. SEC. The Dirks Court noted that insider trading liability could extend to
non-employee outsiders who “have entered into a special confidential relationship in the
conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes.” The Court cited underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and consultants as
examples of temporary insiders. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
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printer Vincent Chiarella, the defendant in Chiarella v. U.S., harms the
shareholders of the company whose capacity to profit from their corporation’s
buying and selling in the capital markets is thwarted by insiders trading on
knowledge of the corporation’s plans.
The SEC’s fairness approach is quite compelling at first blush, but it is
logically infirm. From a fairness perspective, banning the insider/lawyer from
trading accomplishes nothing. From the point of view of property rights in
intellectual property, regulating insiders’ ability to trade accomplishes a great
deal in terms of efficiency.
In our hypothetical, banning insider trading from a fairness point of
view accomplishes nothing because if the lawyer/insider is successfully barred
from trading, the group that ostensibly would have been harmed by such
trading (the target company’s shareholders) simply will end up selling their
shares to the lawyer’s client, the acquirer. The target shareholders, of course,
are indifferent between selling at the low, pre-bid price to the lawyer/insider
and selling at the same low, pre-bid price to the acquirer/client. On the other
hand, a successful prohibition on trading by the insider/lawyer has clear
benefits from an efficiency point of view because it enables the putative
acquirer to obtain an economic return on its investments in searching for and
analyzing undervalued companies.39
In the preceding paragraph I used the example of a takeover bid at a
premium over the target company’s share price to illustrate the futility of
achieving fairness through a “disclose or abstain” rule. Ultimately, the rule
merely ends up substituting the company making the bid for the insider or
temporary insider who would have traded if not prohibited from doing so by
insider trading law. From the perspective of the uninformed selling shareholder,
39

The SEC has curtailed, but not eliminated, the ability of acquirers to capture the full gains
of their costly search and analysis by requiring them to disclose their identity and plans
within ten days after acquiring a five percent stake in a publicly traded target company.
Securities Exchange Act, Rule 13-d, Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1, 240.13d-7 (1986).
While in theory it is possible for a bidder to acquire 100% of a target company’s stock within
ten days of crossing the five percent threshold, as a practical matter, such a rapid flurry of
purchases would drive the target company’s share price prohibitively high. Jonathan R.
Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U. L.
REV. 131 (1987); see also David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney,
Resistance to Tender Offers and Optimal Property Rights in Assets, 73 VA. L. REV. 701
(1987); Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980) (observing that Regulation
13D and other regulations that require immediate disclosure of information about an
acquirer’s identity and plans have diluted acquiring firms’ property rights in information and
led to significant welfare losses by reducing searches for undervalued firms and reducing the
incidence of wealth creating transactions, such as synergy-creating mergers, and hostile
acquisitions that displace inefficient or corrupt management).
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of course the “disclose or abstain” rule in no way creates a level playing field.
The asymmetric information problem persists. Only the identity of the seller’s
counter-party changes.
This is not the only flaw in the fairness approach. There are three other,
more significant flaws. First, the approach is only fair if one considers fairness
from the narrow perspective of the selling shareholders. Once the shareholders
of the bidding firm are taken into account one immediately sees that, even if
one were to assume that the selling shareholders benefitted from disclosure by
the trading insider, this benefit simply would represent a wealth transfer from
the shareholders of the bidding firm, who would have enjoyed the benefits of
a lower acquisition price, to the shareholders of the target firm, who would
have enjoyed the benefits of a higher acquisition price.
Second, the wealth transfer described above would be accompanied by
a dead weight social loss. The bidding firm, anticipating that the “disclose or
abstain” rule would reduce the profitability of its search for undervalued
targets, would invest less in such search. This, in turn, would have the
inevitable consequence of leaving more companies in the hands of inept or
dishonest management. The underperformance of these firms, with its
concomitant drag on employment and productivity, represents an incalculable
dead weight social loss.40
Finally, as David Haddock and I have shown in previous work,41 if, as
is universally the case, the shareholding populations of public companies are
heterogeneous with respect to their ability to process the information disclosed
to them by insiders, the “disclose or abstain” doctrine will not benefit all or
even most target firm shareholders. Rather, the subset of a company’s shareholders who are market professionals such as hedge fund operators and
professional traders in investment banking firms, will be the first to synthesize
public disclosures by insiders and to effectuate trades in the capital markets
based on those disclosures. These trades will cause the price of the relevant
firm to adjust to its new, “correct”42 level, so that, yet again, the “true outsiders”
who are the “very average investors” that the SEC purports to protect with its
“disclose or abstain” rule end up selling their shares before the share price has
adjusted to reflect the new information. Thus, the SEC’s fairness approach,
40

The loss is incalculable because there is no way to measure how many additional
reallocations of underutilized assets would be effectuated if a more efficient set of rules was
in place.
41
See generally David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311
(1987); Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, A Coasean Model of Insider Trading, 80
NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986).
42
Correct in the sense that it has adjusted to reflect the previously non-public material
information upon which the insider trading was predicated.
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reflected in the “disclose or abstain” doctrine does not actually make the
markets fairer. It simply shifts the beneficiaries of the asymmetric information
away from insiders and towards market professionals.
B. A Strange Turn in Doctrinal Development: The Personal
Benefit Test
After reaffirming the property rights orientation of the Court that was
established in Chiarella, the Dirks opinion takes a strange doctrinal turn. The
test developed to determine when a tip is made in breach of a fiduciary duty is
the personal benefit test. The personal benefit test, as its name implies, posits
that it is impermissible for tipping and trading to occur when the tipper receives
a personal benefit in exchange for the information. If a tipper receives a
personal benefit, then the tip violates the tipper’s fiduciary duty, and the tippee
may not trade. Stranger still, by parity of reasoning, Dirks stands for the
proposition that, if a tipper receives no personal benefit in exchange for his tip,
then unconstrained trading on the basis of the tip is entirely permissible.
The SEC had long hoped to avoid a legal rule requiring a showing of
an improper motive by a tipper or a trader.43 But most believed that after the
Court’s decision in Dirks, “[a] finding of insider trading liability would
thereafter turn, to a great extent, on the motive of the insider, on whether the
‘insider personally benefited, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure,’”44
which of course was precisely what the SEC had long hoped to avoid.45
The personal benefit test, however, is not a particularly accurate tool
for discerning motive. Someone who receives a personal benefit for doing
something can nonetheless have motives that are pure. An attorney who works
as a paid public defender receives a pecuniary benefit (salary) for her work,
and yet may be motivated primarily by a desire to do good. Ronald Secrist,
Raymond Dirks’ primary tipper, was deemed by the Court in Dirks to have had
pure motives because he received no personal benefit for his tip. But this is not
necessarily the case. Secrist might have been a disgruntled employee who had
been passed over for a promotion, and was motivated purely by a desire for
revenge. Likewise, if one imagines a hypothetical case that mimics the facts of
Dirks exactly, except that in the hypothetical case the tipper gets cash in
addition to the psychological satisfaction of putting an end to a massive fraud,
43

Fair to All People, supra note 7.
Id.
45
Id.; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 927-42 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
deliberation over the law behind insider trading and the role of motive in convicting an
individual under the SEC’s rules).
44
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it is not clear why the tipper’s receipt of cash should lead to liability. In sum,
if the goal is to create a test capable of discerning the motivation of the tipper,
the personal benefit test is a poor tool. It does not capture all instances of venal
tipping, and it captures some tipping that is not entirely or even mostly venal.
It is, perhaps, more apt to view the personal benefit test not as a litmus
test of the motives of insiders who engage in tipping, but rather as an
assessment of the effects that trading on the basis of such tipping has on capital
markets. To the extent that some trading benefits capital markets by exposing
fraud and making the prices of financial assets more accurate, it should be
encouraged because the increased accuracy of stock prices improves allocative
efficiency and increases societal wealth.
More accurate securities prices lead to greater allocative efficiency
because, when companies with better prospects enjoy higher securities prices,
they can access capital at a lower cost and reward the investors who have
identified such firms, the entrepreneurs who founded such firms, and the
managers whose efforts increased the value of such firms. Companies that have
poor prospects will have more difficulty raising capital if prices are accurate.
On the other hand, other insider trading harms capital markets by
depriving the companies who actually create such information from profiting
from the costly investments that led to that information being created in the first
place. The Supreme Court encountered just such a situation in U.S. v. O’Hagan,46
in which a giant British food company, Grand Met, hired a Minneapolis law firm,
Dorsey & Whitney, to advise it in its campaign to take over Pillsbury.47 A lawyer
at Dorsey & Whitney, James O’Hagan, got his hands on the material insider
information that Grand Met was making a play for Pillsbury before Grand Met
could begin buying shares in Pillsbury.48 O’Hagan then made significant profits
buying Pillsbury stock and stock options and other derivative instruments linked
to the value of Pillsbury stock before Grand Met announced its bid, and then
selling those securities post announcement of the bid.49 O’Hagan legitimated the
so-called “misappropriation” theory of insider trading, according to which
insider trading is illegal when the trader commits fraud by misappropriating
information that rightfully belongs to the source of the inside information.
The misappropriation theory posited that the information that Grand
Met wanted to acquire Pillsbury shares at a significant premium over market
belonged to the company that created that information: Grand Met. By trading
46

United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 648.
48
Id.
49
Id. (noting that after the announcement, O'Hagan “sold his Pillsbury call options and
common stock, making a profit of more than $4.3 million”).
47
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on that information, O’Hagan was stealing (misappropriating) information
from Grand Met that had been entrusted to the law firm where O’Hagan
worked. As a partner in that firm, O’Hagan had a contractual duty, not to
mention an ethical duty, to refrain from trading on the basis of information
given to his firm in confidence by a client. By trading, O’Hagan breached his
duty of trust and confidence. And he went to jail when he was caught.50
There is no question that defendant O’Hagan had venal motives when
he purloined the information about Grand Met’s impending bid for Pillsbury
and traded on it. The harm in O’Hagan, however, was not caused by
O’Hagan’s quest for illicit trading profits. The harm was caused by the change
in securities prices spawned by O’Hagan’s purchases. The natural effect of
O’Hagan’s trading was to drive up the price of Pillsbury stock. Every cent by
which Pillsbury’s share price increased constituted an increase in the price that
O’Hagan’s client, Grand Met, would have to pay for those shares. Worse, this
increase signaled to astute Wall Street stock watchers the existence of an
impending tender offer for Pillsbury shares, which might have ruined Grant
Met’s plans entirely by rendering the acquisition of Pillsbury shares prohibitively expensive.
Thus from a capital markets perspective, O’Hagan’s motives were
irrelevant. Even if O’Hagan received no personal benefit, his conduct should
have been deemed illegal. Suppose, for example, that O’Hagan had not traded
on the information, but had instead passed it along to a trader. Under the personal
benefit test developed in Dirks, O’Hagan’s culpability would hinge on whether
he received a personal benefit in exchange for his tip. But it is not at all clear
why this should be the case. The harm to Grand Met and the damage to capital
markets is still the same, regardless of whether O’Hagan breached his confidentiality obligation to his client by tipping for free or for something of value.
Thus, for the Supreme Court, the personal benefit test is the central
focus of the inquiry into whether trading on the basis of an insider’s tip is
illegal, despite the fact that the personal benefit test is a rather crude test for
determining motive. For its part, the SEC views the motive of the tipper as
irrelevant because the SEC views the legal propriety of insider trading not
through the lens of property rights and misappropriation, but from the point of
view of “fairness,” where fairness is defined as parity of information.
The rather simplistic approaches of both the SEC and the Supreme
Court make it possible to illustrate the differences between the approach to
tipper liability taken by the SEC and the Court in the following chart:
50

O'Hagan was convicted of theft in state court, sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment,
and fined. See State v. O’Hagan, 474 N.W. 2d 613, 615, 623 (Minn. App. 1991). The
Supreme Court of Minnesota disbarred O’Hagan from the practice of law. See In re
O’Hagan, 450 N.W. 2d 571 (1990).
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Motive for Tip
SEC
Personal benefit shown:
Yes
No proof of personal benefit shown:
Yes

41

Federal Courts
Yes
No

Thus, the decades-long battle between the SEC and the federal courts
stems from the fact that the SEC declines to countenance even the possibility
that some instances of tipping on the basis of material non-public information
might be permissible. Because the SEC takes the view that the only possible
motivations for tipping are nefarious, it would categorically ban all trading
following tips of material non-public information.
The Supreme Court has taken a decidedly different view. Federal
courts are of the view that trading on the basis of insider tips about fraud, or on
the basis of tips provided for some valid corporate purpose are beneficial, not
harmful to markets and should be encouraged. The personal benefit test in
Dirks reflects the Court’s initial attempt to distinguish wrongful insider trading
from beneficial insider trading that should be encouraged.
II. TIPPING: A MORE COMPLETE TAXONOMY
The simple taxonomy in the above chart does not cover every possible
context in which trading on the basis of a tip from an insider might occur.
For example, in United States v. Salman,51 U.S. District Judge Jed
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicated that tipping might occur not
only for pecuniary gains (O’Hagan) or to expose fraud (Dirks), but also simply
by accident or mistake. As Judge Rakoff observed, “whistleblowing quite
aside, corporate insiders, in the many conversations they typically have with
stock analysts, often accidentally or mistakenly disclose material information
that is not immediately available to the public.”52
While it seems obvious that Judge Rakoff is right in observing that
insider trading sometimes occurs by accident or mistake, the tipping in the
Salman case itself was done on purpose and not by accident or mistake, and
the Supreme Court, in affirming Judge Rakoff’s decision, does not expand on
the issue.53
51

792 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
Id. (emphasis added).
53
This point, however, was worth making because Justice Powell’s decision in Dirks does
not consider the possibility of accidental or mistaken tipping. What is strange about Judge
52
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In stark contrast to Salman, in both Dirks and U.S. v. Newman,54 federal
courts have focused with laser-like precision on what they view as insider
trading that serves a valid corporate purpose in ordinary corporate communications that does not involve whistleblowing or serendipitous mistake.
The historical record is quite clear that Justice Powell, who wrote the
majority opinions in both Dirks and in its illustrious progenitor: Chiarella v.
U.S,55 expressed significant concern that without careful oversight from the
Supreme Court, SEC regulation of insider trading “could impair market
efficiency.”56 In particular, as Adam Pritchard trenchantly has observed, in
Chiarella, Justice Powell “saw the SEC’s efforts to impose a ‘parity of
information’ rule as undermining ‘incentives to perform market research in
order to discover undervalued stocks and thereby bring about a more efficient
allocation of resources.’”57 According to Pritchard, Justice Powell “agreed
with a student author in the Harvard Law Review: ‘[t]he courts must also
recognize . . . the importance of preserving incentives for legitimate economic
effort, such as gathering new information or perceptively analyzing generally
available facts.’”58
In light of the important role played by efficiency analysis in the
jurisprudence of insider trading, it is passing strange59 that Judge Rakoff did
not entertain the possibility that benign tipping by insiders could be done for a
reason other than whistleblowing and accident or mistake.
Newman involved trading by Todd Newman, a portfolio manager at a
hedge fund, Diamondback Capital Management, LLC, and Anthony Chiasson,
a portfolio manager at another hedge fund, Level Global Investors, L.P., on the
Rakoff’s decision is that it fails to recognize any contexts in which justifiable trading might
occur other than whistleblowing to reveal fraud or other illegal activity. For Judge Rakoff,
the “benign” category of insider trading, that which occurs for a valid business purpose, does
not appear to exist.
54
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
55
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
56
Pritchard, supra note 30, at 931.
57
Id. (quoting Bench Memorandum, Chiarella v. United States, to Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., at 7 (Sept. 28, 1979)).
58
Id. (quoting Justice Powell’s handwritten notes on the margins of a photocopy of Case
Comment, The Application of Rule 10b-5 to “Market Insiders”: United States v. Chiarella,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1543 (1979)).
59
Here I use the term “passing strange” to mean exceedingly strange, which is how the term
was used by William Shakespeare in Othello and John Milton in Paradise Regained, as
distinct from “moderately strange,” which is what the phrase has come to mean to some,
including Chief Justice Roberts, in the 20th century. (In 1985, John Roberts wrote to another
White House aide that, “[i]t strikes me as more than passing strange for us to tell Congress
it cannot pass a law preventing courts from ordering busing when our own Justice Department invariably urges this policy on the courts.”)
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basis of tips from investor relations officers at two public companies, Dell and
NVIDIA, who were casual acquaintances of analysts at the hedge funds who
worked for the portfolio managers. 60 The defendants established that it was
common for insiders at Dell to disclose “confidential quarterly financial
information arguably similar to the inside information disclosed by [the Dell
defendants] to establish relationships with financial firms who might be in a
position to buy Dell's stock.”61 Significantly, in Newman, the Second Circuit
fully embraced the concept that there are legitimate and benign reasons why
corporate insiders might want to disclose material, non-public information to
stock market analysts and other capital market participants who follow their
companies’ equity securities just as it had in Dirks. Unlike Judge Rakoff, the
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have recognized that such tipping might
occur for reasons other than whistleblowing or accident or mistake.
Specifically, in Dirks, the Court observed that:
[I]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material non-public information from an
insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the
role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to ‘ferret out and analyze information,’ and this
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers
and others who are insiders. And information that the analysts
obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst’s judgment in this
respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients
of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed
of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made
simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders
or the public generally.62
Likewise, in Newman, the Second Circuit built on the Dirks Court’s
point, which was that tipping that does not involve any theft or misappropriation
of information, but that does move equity prices in the correct direction, is
beneficial to markets and should be permitted. The court in Newman stressed in
particular the testimony of one witness about how the corporate relations departments at public companies routinely operate. This witness:
60

United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015).
61
Id. at 454-55.
62
Dirks v. United States, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (citations omitted).
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testified that he frequently spoke to investor relations
departments to run his [valuation] model by them and ask
whether his assumptions were ‘too high or too low’ or in the
‘ball park,’ which suggests analysts routinely updated numbers
in advance of the earnings announcements. [Another witness
from Dell’s corporate relations department] confirmed that
investor relations departments routinely assisted analysts with
developing their models.63
Similarly, the Second Circuit found in Newman that “the evidence
established that NVIDIA and Dell’s investor relations personnel routinely
‘leaked’ earnings data in advance of quarterly earnings” announcements by the
companies.64 The Newman court viewed this evidence as exculpatory for the
trading defendants because the disclosures were deemed by the court to have
furthered the interests of the companies (NVIDIA and Dell) whose employees
made the disclosures. Specifically, the court held that even if the trading
defendants had been able to discern from the nature of the data conveyed to
them by their analysts that the tips they received were from an insider, the
information they were given:
cannot, without more, permit an inference as to that source’s
improper motive for disclosure. That is especially true here,
where the evidence showed that corporate insiders at Dell and
NVIDIA regularly engaged with analysts and routinely selectively disclosed the same type of information.65
Following the economic framework suggested in Dirks, the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Newman indicates that, as a descriptive matter, insiders who
work in corporate communications departments and in the office of the Chief
Financial Officer in public companies, who often are tasked with communicating
information to analysts who work with traders at hedge funds and other financial
firms, should be allowed to make those communications of non-public
information for valid corporate purposes, notwithstanding the prohibitions in
Regulation FD.66 The courts in Dirks and Newman explicitly recognize that such
63

Newman, 773 F.3d at 454
Id.
65
Id. at 455
66
While Regulation FD mandates that all publicly traded companies disclose material, nonpublic information to all investors at the same time, the sanctions are tepid, and it is not clear
whether the Regulation has had much effect on corporate behavior. See Report of
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Netflix,
64
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tipping can serve legitimate corporate purposes such as promoting analyst
coverage and or correcting misperceptions in the trading community that lead to
mispricing of the company’s shares. As an analytical matter, this tipping is done
for a personal benefit, which is the tipper’s remuneration. But such tipping has
not only been permitted, it has been endorsed in both Dirks and Newman. The
courts simply have not recognized that the tipping in these cases is done for a
personal benefit in the form of the tippers’ compensation. But the fact remains
that the courts’ endorsement of systematic tipping by insiders for a valid corporate purpose establishes that it does not constitute securities fraud.
Adding the fact that insider information can be transmitted by mistake
or accident to: (a) the Dirks Court’s recognition that tipping can be a form of
whistleblowing; (b) the Salman Court’s treatment of familial relationships; and
(c) the Newman Court’s appreciation of the salutary effects of insider trading
allows us to develop a much more complete taxonomy of insider trading. The
remainder of this section of the Article provides examples of the various
contexts in which tipping, both legal and illegal, might occur.
A. Pecuniary Benefit
Most obviously, tipping can occur because a venal insider wants to
monetize her special access to material non-public information about an event
at the company for which she works. For example, in the late spring of 2016,
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice
charged an investment banker, Steven McClatchey—who had regular access to
highly confidential non-public information about impending deals being
pursued for his firm’s investment bank clients—with providing this information
to a plumber, Gary Pusey. Specifically, when Mr. McClatchey learned in the
course of his investment banking work that a client company was going to
acquire or be acquired by another company at a premium to market price, he
would alert Mr. Pusey, who would then buy shares in the target company at the
pre-acquisition price, making significant trading profits. Mr. Pusey, in return for
this information, not only provided Mr. McClatchey with gym bags full of cash,
but also with something money cannot buy: free plumbing services for Mr.
McClatchey’s bathroom remodeling project.67
Inc., and Reed Hastings, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69,279, [2012-2013 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,972 (Apr. 2, 2013) (disapproving, but not sanctioning
Netflix President Reed Hastings’s use of his personal Facebook page to disclose important
company news); see also Bruce A. Ericson, Regulation FD After Siebel Systems: No Longer
“The Hobgoblin of Little Minds”?, SEC. LITIG. REPORT (Nov. 2005).
67
Complaint, SEC v. Steven V. McClatchey, 1:16-CV-04029, 2016 WL 3078744 (S.D.N.Y.
filed May 31, 2016).
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There is no question in anybody’s mind that this sort of trading is, and
should be, illegal.
B. Family Relationship
United States v. Salman68 is the classic case in which the personal
benefit test of Dirks is met by a showing that the offending tip was made as a
gift to a family member. In Salman, Maher Kara, who worked in the Citigroup
healthcare investment banking group, tipped his older brother Mounir
(“Michael”) Kara, who became increasingly “brazen and more persistent in his
requests for information.”69 In the midst of these conversations between
brothers, Maher, the tipping brother, became engaged to the sister of one
Bassam Salman, who got to know the family and became close friends with
his future bother-in-law Michael. Michael began giving the information he got
from his brother Maher to Salman, who traded on it in an account held in the
name of yet another relative. So, Maher tipped his brother Michael, who tipped
Maher’s future brother-in-law Salman.
In his defense at trial, Salman argued that evidence of a friendship or
familial relationship between tipper and tippee is insufficient to demonstrate
that the tipper received a benefit, absent evidence of a “personal benefit”
conferred upon the tipper Maher by his tippee Michael.70 This argument is
clearly wrong as a matter of law because the Supreme Court explicitly held in
Dirks that a violation of the law occurs “when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading friend relative.”71
A gift is, by definition, “something voluntarily transferred by one
person to another without payment.”72 It cannot be the case that the government
must show that the tipper received a benefit, but that apparently is what Salman
argued in his unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth Circuit. As Judge Rakoff
observed in his opinion in the case, the law of insider trading is crystal clear
68

792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
Id. at 1088-89.
70
Id. at 1090. In Salman, Michael Kara, the tippee, in turn, tipped the defendant, Salman,
but the court did not confront the issue, decided in Newman, of whether the government must
prove that such a remote tippee had knowledge of the personal benefit that the insider-tipper
received for disclosing inside information to the tipper because the jury in Salman was
instructed that Salman “knew that Maher Kara personally benefitted in some way, directly
or indirectly, from the disclosure of the allegedly inside information to Mounir (‘Michael’)
Kara.” Id. at 1091 n.2 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 450).
71
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
72
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, SIMPLE DEFINITION OF GIFT, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dicti
onary/gift (last visited Sept. 3, 2016).
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that a familial relationship such as that permeating the facts of Salman is
sufficient to satisfy Dirks’s personal benefit test. As Judge Rakoff noted,
personal benefit is broadly defined to include “not only pecuniary gain, but
also, inter alia, . . . the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”73
Thus, there is no doubt that it is illegal to trade on the basis of a tip from
a relative or close friend. Establishing that a defendant traded on the basis of
a tip from a relative should be enough. The argument that the government must
prove both a familial connection and a quid pro quo in order to obtain an insider
trading conviction is both odd and untenable. As the Supreme Court held in
Salman v. United States, “[t]o the extent that the Second Circuit held that the
tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’
in exchange for a gift to family or friends, Newman . . . we agree with the Ninth
Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”74 Insider trading on
the basis of a tip from a close friend or relative is illegal all by itself.
C. Accidents, Mistakes and Intentional Tipping with No Personal Benefit
1. Accidents and Mistakes
As noted above, Judge Rakoff in Salman condones insider trading on
the basis of tips that are passed along by mistake. The basis for condoning
trading on the basis of accidental or mistaken tips is found in in Dirks. Where
a tip is passed along by happenstance, prosecutors are unable to obtain a
conviction because they are unable to meet the personal benefit test in Dirks.
The strange fact that it is legal to trade on the basis of a tip that is passed
along as a result of carelessness on the part of the tipper reflects poorly on the
personal benefit test. The most fundamental tenet of Supreme Court jurisprudence on insider trading is that there can be no liability for trading on the
basis of material non-public information unless such trading is in breach of a
fiduciary duty. To the extent that the personal benefit test is inconsistent with
the fiduciary duty element of insider trading law, the test is suspect.
Trading on the basis of material non-public information is wrong when
there is an abuse of a “relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose” and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, due to the “unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of [insider information] by trading without disclosure.”75
73

Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093.
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (internal citation and alteration omitted).
75
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912, 912 n.15 (1961)).
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Where an insider trades on information she has received as the result
of a mistake on the part of the tipper, and the insider knows that the information
is in her possession because of a mistake on the part of the insider/tipper, then
it stands to reason that the trader inherits the insider’s fiduciary obligation to
keep the information confidential. As Dirks made clear, a trading “tippee’s
duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s duty” to keep
the information confidential.76 In other words, an insider is in a relationship
affording access to information intended for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone just as much when she tips by mistake as when
she tips for cash. And trading by a tippee on the basis of information obtained
by mistake is plagued by as much “inherent unfairness” when the information
was received because of a mistake on the part of the tipper as when the
information is received in exchange for cash or some other personal benefit.
Turning to the issue of fiduciary duties in instances of tipping by
accident or mistake as distinct from tipping in return for a personal benefit,
there is a transparent breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty when an insider
“sells out” by disclosing in exchange for cash or other emoluments. The
particular duty violated in this case is the fiduciary duty of loyalty. But the
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not the only fiduciary duty. There also exists a
fiduciary duty of care, which obligates fiduciaries to act with the care of a
reasonably prudent person in the discharge of their responsibilities. Just as the
fiduciary duty of loyalty is the appropriate test when traders and tippers put
their own personal interests ahead of the firm’s, the fiduciary duty of care is
the applicable test when a tipper fails to act reasonably to manage the
confidential information entrusted to their care and a trader exploits the tipper’s
carelessness by trading on the information.
The argument for employing a negligence perspective to trading on the
basis of accident or mistake seems particularly strong when an insider’s
responsibilities require interacting with stock market analysts at hedge funds
and other trading operations, as was the case in Newman.77 In this context,
76

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
An issue that must be confronted in imposing liability for negligent tipping is whether
negligence is sufficient to trigger the applicable scienter requirement for liability. Certainly
a strong argument can be made that public policy favors liability for negligent securities
fraud. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980) (holding “that allegations of simple
negligence [can] not sustain a private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5”). The rejection of negligence as a suitable form of scienter is based on the language
of § 10(b), which uses the terms “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance,” purportedly
evincing a “a congressional intent to proscribe only ‘knowing or intentional misconduct.’”
Id. at 690 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun has argued that public policy
favors liability for negligent securities fraud. Id. at 716-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
77
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acting reasonably requires the insider to use appropriate care in safeguarding
the information entrusted to her. Oddly missing from defenses of tippers who
“mistakenly” or “accidentally” provide hedge fund managers and other
investment professionals with material non-public information, including
Judge Rakoff’s in Salman, is any consideration of the fact that the tip reflects
a breach of the fiduciary duty of care on the part of the insider.
A particularly notorious case of accidental tipping involved former
Dallas Cowboys football coach Barry Switzer.78 At the time of the insider
trading incident, Mr. Switzer was a college football coach in Norman,
Oklahoma. On June 6, 1981, Mr. Switzer, along with several hundred other
spectators, attended a high school track meet being held at a field on the
University of Oklahoma campus. Mr. Switzer, who was there to watch his son
compete in an event, arrived at the track between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.
George and Linda Platt, who also had a son competing at the track event,
arrived just before Switzer, sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. Mr.
Platt was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of a publicly held oil
exploration and development enterprise called Texas International Company,
and he and his wife were acquaintances of Mr. Switzer. At the time of the track
meet, Texas International owned over fifty percent of the shares in another
energy exploration and development business, Phoenix Resources Company,
and had just decided two days before the track meet to retain the investment
bank Morgan Stanley to initiate a sale of Phoenix.
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (“[W]hen misinformation causes loss, it is small
comfort to the investor to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by
fraudulent design . . . . [I]njunctions against negligent dissemination of misinformation play
an essential role in preserving market integrity and preventing serious financial loss.”); see
also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978) (observing that “impressive
policies” support SEC authority to seek relief against securities fraud caused by negligence).
Moreover, recklessness appears to satisfy the scienter requirement of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) did not address “the question
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 193 n.12. Nonetheless, it did note that several circuits had
held that “reckless disregard for the truth” could constitute scienter in a securities fraud
action. Id. Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that “reckless conduct satisfies the scienter
requirement.” Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations
omitted). The court “recognized that recklessness may serve as a surrogate concept for
willful fraud,” given that the “common law tort of fraud has adopted a recklessness standard
as one means of satisfying the requisite intent element of that cause of action.” Id. (citations
omitted). Although recklessness may not meet the willfulness requirement for criminal
liability (see 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (predicating liability upon a showing that the individual
“willfully” or “willfully and knowingly” violated this provision)), it is sufficient to meet the
scienter test for civil liability.
78
SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
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The district court found the information that Texas International
planned to liquidate Phoenix and to retain an investment banking firm to assist
in the transaction was non-public information that “a reasonable investor
would consider important.”79
According to the trial court, at some point during the track meet,
Switzer laid down on a row of bleachers behind the Platts . . .
While Switzer was sunbathing, he overheard [George] Platt
talking to his wife about . . . . Morgan Stanley and his desire to
dispose of or liquidate Phoenix. . . . Switzer also overheard that
an announcement of a ‘possible’ liquidation of Phoenix might
occur the following Thursday.80
The district court also seemed to accept testimony that Mr. Platt was
not aware that Mr. Switzer was within earshot when he was chatting with his
wife about the sale of his company’s subsidiary,81 indicating that the court was
entirely convinced of the veracity of Mr. Platt’s testimony.
Immediately after the track meet, Mr. Switzer went home, looked up
the share price of Phoenix and met with Sedwyn Kennedy, a friend of Switzer
with whom he invested through a partnership called SKS. Mr. Switzer told Mr.
Kennedy that he had overheard a conversation about the possible liquidation
of Phoenix and that the transaction was likely either to occur or be announced
within a few days. Mr. Switzer revealed to Mr. Kennedy that his source for this
stock tip was a “gentlemen who was an executive with TIC.”82 According to
the trial court, Switzer and Kennedy were “close friends” who had known one
another for a long time.83 Messrs. Switzer and Kennedy agreed that buying
Phoenix stock would be a good idea.
Mr. Switzer purchased 35,000 shares of Phoenix stock through a variety
of partnerships with various friends and made significant trading profits.
According to the trial court, TIC’s Mr. Platt did not receive any “direct or
indirect pecuniary gain nor any reputational benefit likely to translate into future
earnings due to Switzer’s inadvertent receipt of the information regarding
Phoenix.”84 While this may be the case, it seems doubtful. Mr. Platt and Mr.
Switzer knew each other well. Mr. Platt’s company was a sponsor of Mr.
79

Id. at 760.
Id. at 762.
81
Id. (“G. Platt was not conscious of Switzer's presence on the bleachers behind him that
day, nor that Switzer had overheard any conversation.”).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 764.
80
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Switzer’s football television show, “Play Back.”85 Mr. Platt was described by
the trial court as “a supporter of Oklahoma University football” who had “met
Switzer at a few social engagements prior to June of 1981.”86 Mr. Switzer had
given autographs to Mr. Platt’s children, and had upgraded Mr. Platt’s season
tickets to football games.87 Mr. Switzer had called Mr. Platt to importune him
to continue to sponsor his television program.88 These personal relationships are
far more extensive than those identified by the government in Newman.
Without explanation or embellishment, the trial court simply concluded
that “[Mr.] Platt did not breach a fiduciary duty to stockholders of Phoenix for
purposes of Rule 10b-5 liability nor § 10(b) liability when he disclosed to his
wife at the track meet of June 6, 1981, that there was going to be a possible
liquidation of Phoenix.”89 It is true that Mr. Platt did not breach his fiduciary
duties by telling his wife about the upcoming sale of Phoenix. He had a good
reason for passing the information along: apparently, Mr. Platt discussed the
transaction with his wife “for the purpose of informing her of his up-coming
business schedule so that arrangements for child care could be made.”90
But the fact that passing along information to one’s spouse does not
automatically represent a breach of one’s fiduciary duties does not mean that
the manner in which such information is passed along is a matter of complete
indifference from a legal point of view. It seems clear that, at some point,
disclosure of material non-public information by “accident” or by “mistake”
reflects such a degree of recklessness and disregard for the importance of
protecting the confidentiality of such information that it constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. Imagine, for example, that Mr. Platt had communicated the
information by accidentally clicking the “Reply All” tab in a message from his
assistant, causing the message to be sent to a large group of people outside of
his company. It seems to me that, at some point, disclosure by “accident” or
“mistake” reflects such a failure to take reasonable steps to protect the
confidentiality of information entrusted to an insider that it violates the
insider’s fiduciary duty of care.
This point becomes stronger in light of the fact that safeguarding
proprietary confidential information is an important part of the professional
responsibilities of corporate officers and directors and the professionals they
hire, particularly at public companies. Significant resources are devoted to
85

Id. at 761.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 766.
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protecting the confidentiality of all sorts of corporate information.91 Formal
protocols govern the way that confidential and proprietary information is
handled within companies and government.92 Casual, public conversations
about confidential information, such as the one that resulted in the information
leak in Switzer, are inconsistent with minimal standards of good corporate
practice. As one large employer informed its supervisory employees: “Integrity
requires congruence between your professional life and your personal habits.
Conversations overheard, chats by the coffee pot, and information that comes
to you accidentally needs to be treated with the same caution as a letter or email correspondence that lands on your desk.”93
Despite the fact that ordinary and customary business practice and good
corporate governance require that significant care be taken to guard against
mistaken or accidental disclosure of confidential information, the district court
in Switzer flatly held that “Rule 10b-5 does not bar trading on the basis of
information inadvertently revealed by an insider.”94 This assertion seems
wrong, particularly when the inadvertent disclosure of material non-public
information reflects recklessness or negligence.
From an economic standpoint, imposing civil liability on inadvertent
tippers would be efficient. Inadvertent disclosure of proprietary non-public
information can potentially lead to the collapse of deals that are significantly
welfare enhancing not only because they generate change-in-control premia for
target company shareholders, but also because they lead to business combinations that increase the returns on the assets of both the acquirer and the
acquired company by creating synergies and reducing costs. In contrast to these
potentially significant welfare gains, the costs of requiring that insiders act with
reasonable care in safeguarding information they obtain in the course of their
work appear minimal.
While complete security is not possible, taking steps to use encrypted
files and secure connections and limiting conversations and other oral communications to appropriately secure locations has become routine and would not
create significant additional costs for companies. For example, it is ordinary
and customary practice for lawyers and investment bankers communicating
91

Jonathan Rosenoer, Safeguarding Your Critical Business Information, HARV. BUS. REV. (2002).
Of course these protocols are not always followed. It is widely known that Hillary Clinton,
while she was Secretary of State, used a personal email system with an account kept on a
server located at her personal residence in Chappaqua, New York, in violation of State
Department protocols. Michael S. Scmidt, Hilary Clinton Used Personal Email Account at
State Dept., Possible Breaking Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2kcy22m.
93
Susan Davis, Leading Edition E-newsletter for Purdue University Supervisors, PURDUE
U NIVERSITY, http://www.purdue.edu/hr/LeadingEdition/LEdi_104_confidentiality.html
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
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Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 766.
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about mergers and acquisitions to eschew cell phones and to limit their conversations to land lines. Code names rather than the actual names of companies
are routinely used in such deals.
As such, the assumption reflected in Switzer and Judge Rakoff’s Salman
opinion, that trading on the basis of an inadvertent tip is automatically legal,
should be reexamined in light of the fact that such tips can be due to the
negligence of the tipper, and the tippee who exploits the information may be well
aware that the information is confidential and meant only for use for a valid
corporate purpose. On the other hand, it is less clear that trading on the basis of
an inadvertent tip can result in criminal as opposed to civil liability. This will
depend on whether the inadvertent tip by an insider was sufficiently reckless
such that the recklessness can satisfy the mens rea element of the relevant statute.
2. Intentional Tipping in Cases in Which There Is No Personal
Benefit to the Tipper
Stunningly, even when someone tips another person intentionally, but
does not receive a personal benefit, neither the tipper nor the tippee has violated
Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on insider trading because there is no personal benefit
to satisfy Dirks’ personal benefit test.95 In SEC v. Maxwell,96 David Maxwell, a
senior executive at Worthington Foods, passed material, non-public information
about Kellogg Co.'s impending purchase of Worthington Foods Inc. to Elton
Jehn, his longtime barber, while receiving a haircut. Mr. Jehn bought Worthington stock and, though he had never purchased options previously in his life, he
also bought 205 call options (purchasing some of these with a credit card). Mr.
Jehn started buying Worthington stock and options on September 22, 1999,
completing his purchases a week later on September 27th. On the morning of
October 1, 1999, when Worthington and Kellogg issued a press release announcing the deal, Worthington’s stock price rose by 61.4%, to $8.75. Mr. Jehn made
a total of $192,000 in trading profits by selling after the announcement.97
95

The exception to the general rule permitting trading on the basis of intentional tips for which
one received no personal benefit is SEC Rule 14e-3, passed in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chiarella v. United States. Rule 14e-3 prohibits insiders of either a bidding firm or a
target firm from tipping confidential information about a tender offer. This rule thereby prohibits
“exactly the kind of tippee information the Supreme Court in Chiarella had found not to be a Rule
10b-5 violation.” Fair to All People, supra note 7. Rule 14e-3 also prohibits any person who
possesses material information relating to a tender offer from trading in target company securities
if the bidder has already taken substantial steps towards commencement of the bid. Id.
96
341 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
97
Complaint, SEC v. Maxwell (S.D. Ohio 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/com
p17944_64.htm. Mr. Jehn started buying Worthington stock on Sept. 22, 1999, the same day that
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There seems to be no doubt that Mr. Maxwell violated a duty of trust
and confidence to Worthington. As the SEC pointed out in its complaint, Mr.
Maxwell “was well aware of Worthington's well-established policy and
prohibitions against insider trading. He understood that he was prohibited from
trading Worthington stock while in possession of material, non-public
information and that he was prohibited from tipping others about that
information.”98 In fact, when Dale Twomley, Worthingon’s CEO told Maxwell
about the Company’s negotiations with Kellogg, “he explicitly instructed
Maxwell to keep the information confidential.”99 And, as is typical in public
companies, Worthington had an insider trading policy that prohibited
employees from trading in Worthington's securities or tipping others while in
possession of material, non-public information.100 According to the district
court, Mr. Worthington was aware of this policy.101
Rather slavishly following Dirks, and rejecting a litany of possible
benefits that tipper-Maxwell could have received, the district court declined to
find a personal benefit and, based on the lack of such a benefit, decided that
the tipping did not violate the tipper’s fiduciary duties. Because the liability of
tippees is “derivative” of tippers’ liability, Mr. Jehn also avoided liability.102
It is true that Dirks stands for the proposition that trading on the basis of
a tip that did not involve a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the tipper is
legal. But in the insider trading context, the existence of fiduciary duties is
coterminous with the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence. Mr.
Maxwell clearly had such a duty. And he clearly breached this duty when he violated his obligation not to disclose the confidential and proprietary information
entrusted to him by his company. In this context, imposing at least civil liability
on Mr. Maxwell is consistent with the law. Imposing such liability also would
be economically efficient, because such liability would be a low-cost mechanism
for providing enhanced protections for companies’ property rights in information, which is precisely what the insider trading laws are designed to do.103
he was tipped by Mr. Maxwell. Id. Mr. Jehn started buying call options a week later on Sept. 27,
1999. Id. On Oct. 1, defendant Jehn liquidated his position in Worthington securities, selling 205
call options. He sold ninety Oct. 15 calls for a profit of $64,774.50, sixty-five October 12 calls for
a profit of $67,944.22, and fifty October 12 calls for a profit of $52,242. Id. He sold 1,500 shares
of Worthington stock for a profit of $15,915.60, bringing his total realized profits to $191,954.57.
98
Id. (“Maxwell breached his duty of trust and confidence to Worthington and its shareholders by disclosing material non-public information to defendant Jehn.”).
99
Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
100
Id.
101
Id.
103
Macey, supra note 18, at 60 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chiarella v.
United States is grounded in the theory that insider information is a form of intellectual
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D. Tipping as Whistleblowing
While the extant law of insider trading does not impose liability readily
enough in cases in which tips occur by accident or mistake, current law imposes
liability far too readily for tipping and trading in the whistleblowing context.
On August 12, 2011, armed with authority conveyed on it in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,104 the Securities and
Exchange Commission finalized the rules for a new, significantly enhanced
whistleblower program.105 Under the new whistleblower program, a whistleblower is anyone who voluntarily provides the SEC with “original information
that leads to the successful enforcement by the SEC of a federal court or
administrative action in which the SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling
more than $1 million.”106 Whistleblowers fill out an online form to become
eligible for bounty, which can be substantial. Often whistleblowers are
represented by counsel to make sure they successfully navigate the steps
necessary to enable them to obtain a reward.
The SEC clearly believes that financial incentives will motivate more
insiders to come forward as whistleblowers when they have material nonpublic information about fraud in companies subject to SEC regulation. And,
of course, the SEC is right; financial incentives provide an additional (and
sometimes the only) motivation for insiders to engage in whistleblowing.
The use of financial incentives to motivate whistleblowing is starkly at
odds with the Supreme Court’s policy, articulated in Dirks, of banning insider
trading that is motivated by financial incentives. In fact, the entire purpose of
Dirks’ personal benefit test is to distinguish between legally permissible insider
trading, which is trading on the basis of tips of material non-public information
that were not motivated by the receipt of any personal benefit, from illegal
insider trading, which is trading on the basis of tips motivated not by a
benevolent desire to ferret out fraud, but by some share in the trading profits or
other pecuniary gain provided by the tippee/trader.
The SEC’s bounty program for whistleblowers appears to be working.
In May 2014, the SEC awarded over $30 million to an anonymous tipper who
made a tip about a company whose identity remains unknown. “I was very
concerned that investors were being cheated out of millions of dollars and that
property, and that the goal of SEC Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on insider trading is to protect
property rights in information).
104
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
105
17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249.
106
Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm.
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the company was misleading them about its actions,” said the whistleblower in
a press release issued by the law firm retained to represent him/her in obtaining
the award.107 The law firm itself noted that its “client exposed extraordinarily
deceitful and opportunistic practices that were deeply entrenched and well
hidden,”108 also noting that “[f]ederal regulators never would have known
about this fraud otherwise, and the scheme to cheat investors likely would have
continued indefinitely.”109
The SEC long had received tips from whistleblowers before enacting
its bounty, but the SEC claims that the new bounties lead to higher quality
information from whistleblowers.110 It is anomalous that the SEC encourages
whistleblowing, while prosecuting tipping about ongoing frauds at public
companies. As I have observed in previous work, there is little if any analytic
or functional distinction between whistleblowing—especially when done for a
bounty—and insider trading.111
To the extent that there are differences between whistleblowing and
insider trading, insider trading is, in several ways, superior to whistleblowing
as a mechanism for revealing fraud and other sorts of illegality in public
companies. Specifically, insider trading has three distinct advantages over
whistleblowing as a means for ferreting out fraud.
First, unlike whistleblowing, those trading on the basis of material
non-public information do not have to convince a bureaucrat at the SEC that
their claims are worth pursuing. Dirks himself was unable to interest the SEC
about the scandal at Equity Funding. Raymond Dirks engaged in both trading
and whistleblowing, but only the trading actually worked, as the SEC and
business journalists at outlets such as the Wall Street Journal chose to ignore
Dirks’ tipping. The history surrounding the fraud at Equity Funding, which was
the subject of the SEC’s enforcement action against Raymond Dirks for insider
trading in Dirks, reveals that whistleblowing was wholly unsuccessful in
107

Press Release, Phillips & Cohen LLP, Largest SEC Whistleblower Reward Goes to
Phillips & Cohen Client—More than $30 Million (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.phillipsand
cohen.com/2014/SEC-awards-Phillips-Cohen-whistleblower-client-30-million-to-35-millio
n-largest-reward-yet.shtml.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Press Release, SEC, supra note 91 (quoting SEC Chairman Mary L Schapiro, who
asserted that “[w]hile the SEC has a history of receiving a high volume of tips and
complaints, the quality of the tips we have received has been better since Dodd-Frank became
law. We expect this trend to continue, and these final rules map out simplified and
transparent procedures for whistleblowers to provide us critical information.”).
111
See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2007).
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ferreting out the fraud at Equity Funding. Mr. Dirks attempted to tip not only
the SEC, but also state insurance commissioners, as well as Equity Funding’s
outside auditors.112
Whistleblowing directed at exposing the fraud at Equity Funding began
in 1971, but the fraud at Equity Funding was not revealed until 1973, when
Dirks began trading. The CEO of Equity Funding and one of the main culprits
of the fraud testified that before the insider trading prompted by Secrist’s
tipping he had “received no questions from auditors, state regulatory authorities, or federal regulatory authorities that suggested that ‘they suspected there
was a fraud at Equity Funding.’” 113
Of course the Equity Funding scandal is only one in a long list of frauds
that the SEC and other financial regulators failed to uncover. Perhaps the most
well-known example of the SEC ignoring a credible tip from a whistleblower is
Harry Markopolos’s efforts to alert the SEC to the massive securities fraud being
perpetrated by Bernie Madoff at his investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities. “[M]y team and I tried our best to get the Securities and
Exchange Commission [SEC] to investigate and shut down the Madoff Ponzi
scheme with repeated and credible warnings,” Markopolos said during his
testimony before the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets.114
He said he submitted an eight-page document listing red flags and mathematical
proof of a major fraud to the SEC’s Boston Regional Office in May of 2000. Mr.
Markopolos resubmitted his evidence to SEC offices in 2001, 2005, 2007, and
2008, without attracting the attention of the regulators.115 It was not until the
financial markets crashed in 2008 and liquidity-strapped investors attempted to
cash-in their investments in large numbers that the fraud was revealed, when
the business simply collapsed as the number of new “investors” sharply declined
and current clients began clamoring for their money in large numbers. Madoff’s fraud caused losses of approximately $17 billion116 among his firm’s 4,800
112

See id. at 1917-19 (discussing the various attempts to engage in whistleblowing
concerning the fraud at Equity Funding).
113
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983) (No. 82-276).
114
Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm.,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE, Chartered Financial
Analyst and Certified Fraud Examiner).
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Dick Carozza, Chasing Madoff: An Interview with Harry Markopolos, FRAUD MAGAZINE
(2009), http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=313.
116
Jordan Maglich, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Five Years Later, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2013/12/09/madoff-ponzi-scheme-five-years-later/.
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clients,117 including the author and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, Yeshiva
University, Tel Aviv’s Technion University, the North Shore-Long Island
Jewish Health System pension fund, and the Korea Teachers Pension fund.118
While the Madoff fraud reveals one significant advantage of insider
trading over whistleblowing as a vehicle for exposing fraud, it also reveals that
insider trading has a structural defect as a mechanism for revealing fraud.
Specifically, while insider trading has the virtue of revealing fraud that
government officials choose to ignore, insider trading can only occur in
companies with shares that trade on public stock markets. Thus, insider trading
was not available as a means to reveal the fraud at Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities because the company was privately held and there was
no public market on which its stock could be shorted or for which derivative
securities such as put options could be created.
A second advantage of insider trading over whistleblowing is the
elimination of false positives. Government agencies, media outlets and others
who receive tips from whistleblowers must verify those tips because there is
no assurance that the information provided by whistleblowers will be accurate.
Whistleblowers may be mistaken, or they may be purposefully inaccurate, as
when they engage in whistleblowing for motives such as revenge or bounty. It
is of course true that those engaging in insider trading on the basis of
knowledge of hidden fraud also are likely to have all sorts of selfish motives.
But unlike with whistleblowing, with insider trading there is a cost to providing
erroneous information. It is costly to those trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about an ongoing fraud to be mistaken because, when one
trades, one loses money on one’s mistakes.
A third advantage of insider trading over whistleblowing is that while
there is no guarantee that there will be any follow-up to a whistleblower’s tip,
if the inside information on which a trader bases her trading is not revealed,
then the share price of the company to which the information pertains will not
change and neither the insider nor her tippee will make trading profits.
Profiting from material non-public information about a fraud in a company
requires that an insider sell shares short (or purchase derivative securities such
as put options or swaps whose value increases when the value of the underlying
assets declines) and then cover the short position at some point in the future
117

Robert Frank, Amir Efrati, Aaron Lucchetti, & Chad Bray, Madoff Jailed After Admitting
Epic Scam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009.
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Madoff’s Victims, WALL ST. J., http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_madoff
_victims_20081215.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2009); see also Exhibit A, “Client List,” http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/madoffclientlist020409.pdf (document listing
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when the company’s share price declines. In the context of fraud, the insider’s
profit-making opportunity does not arise unless and until the fraud at the
company is revealed. Unless the fraud is revealed somehow, such as by the
announcement of an investigation or litigation by a regulatory agency, or in a
news report, the company’s share price may remain stable or even increase in
value, leaving the trader with a costly position to unwind.
All seem to agree that whistleblowing, even for entirely venal reasons
such as revenge, should be encouraged and rewarded. But insider trading, even
to reveal a massive fraud in a public company, cannot be done for profit, but
only for altruistic reasons. Even in situations, like Madoff and Dirks¸ in which
insiders tried and failed to inform regulators of corporate fraud, insider trading
to reveal such fraud is impermissible if the tipper seeks a “bounty” in the form
of a personal benefit in exchange for the information.
One response to the argument that insider trading based on fraud is
equivalent to whistleblowing is that, in the insider trading context, the trading
comes at the expense of investors, while in whistleblowing, the remuneration
for the information reduces the recovery for all shareholders and therefore is
more fairly distributed. There are two answers to this objection to insider
trading about fraud on fairness grounds. First, any unfairness associated with
insider trading that reveals fraud is merely a problem of allocating the gains
and losses of an unambiguously socially desirable outcome: the revelation of
fraud. While it may be more desirable for fraud to be revealed by whistleblowing than by tipping by insiders followed by trading by tippees, history in
the form of the Madoff and Equity Funding scandals shows that fraud will go
undetected if we rely solely on whistleblowers. As such, insider trading to
reveal fraud as occurred in Dirks may, as the Supreme Court indicated, be the
only way to uncover some instances of fraud.
Second, from the perspective of the counterparty who trades with
someone with material non-public information, there is no difference between
Dirks-style insider trading, which is done for free, and insider trading that is
done for some kind of pecuniary benefit. The counterparty’s losses are the
same, and therefore, the permissible trading in Dirks is not distinguishable
from a fairness point of view from trading based on the same underlying
information about fraud that is motivated by a financial incentive.
Finally, there is reason to believe that those who trade with tippees may
be in a better position to bear the losses associated with such trading than other
investors. Research on insider trading reveals an important distinction between
“price function” traders who are motivated to trade by perceived arbitrage
opportunities presented by price distortions and “time function” traders, whose
trading is not based on an informed view of the value of securities relative to
their prices, but on external factors, particularly changing demands for savings
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and liquidity over the course of a family’s life cycle.119 Price-function traders
are the arbitragers, floor traders, investment bankers, and hedge funds who
invest in finding value. When an insider sells on the basis of a tip, the temporary
decline in the price of the stock sold will be perceived by these price function
traders as an arbitrage opportunity, because the low price makes the stock look
like a bargain based on these price-function traders’ models. In contrast, the
insider trading will have no effect on time function traders whose trading is not
motivated by price. In contrast to price function traders, who are professionals
(or day traders who think that they are professionals), time function traders are
not motivated by short-term fluctuations in securities prices, so insider trading
will not deleteriously affect them. This point is particularly strong in light of
the fact that, unlike price function traders, rational time function traders will
hold diversified portfolios of securities that make them immune to the effects
of insider trading because, statistically speaking, they will be trading alongside
insiders as often as they will be trading against insiders.120
E. Beyond Fraud: Tipping for the Good of the Company
As the Courts in both Dirks and Newman recognized, insider trading
can be consistent with a tipper’s fiduciary duties. When tipping is done to
further a legitimate corporate purpose, it is permissible. In addition to revealing
corporate fraud, valid corporate purposes include correcting misinformation
about securities pricing and attracting a more attentive and extensive range of
coverage by financial analysts. Thus, while it is illegitimate to exploit material
non-public information for personal gain, it is legitimate to pass along the same
information to others who profit from it, as long as the motive does not involve
a personal benefit.
Under current law, a corporate insider can provide a tip to a trader at a
hedge fund, and as long as the insider does not receive a personal benefit, the
insider is not legally responsible for providing the tip, regardless of the harm
the tip causes to the corporation. This strange result is due to the fact that under
the personal benefit test established by the Dirks Court, the test of whether an
insider’s tip is in breach of a fiduciary duty is not whether the tip furthers the
corporation’s interests, but whether the insider refers a personal benefit from
providing the tip.
Corporations should have the right to determine when their employees
and agents trade on the basis of the proprietary information they receive in the
course of their official duties, but the personal benefit test effectively deprives
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them of this in two ways. First, the personal benefit test does not require a tipper
to obtain the consent of her company—or even to provide notice to the company—prior to tipping, even in cases in which it clearly is in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders to keep such information confidential, as in
the case of an impending tender offer for the shares of another company. Regardless of the content of the information, as long as the tipper does not receive a
personal benefit from her tip, the tipping and subsequent trading are legal.
Second, and perhaps even more bizarrely, according to a separate line
of Supreme Court reasoning developed in O’Hagan, where a corporate insider
directly engages in trading on the basis of material non-public information,
such trading does not violate the securities laws as long as the trading insider
notifies the company of her intention to trade.121 In O’Hagan, in the course of
deciding that James O’Hagan was criminally liable for trading on the basis of
material non-public information about an impending tender offer for the
outstanding shares of Pillsbury, the Court indicates that Mr. O’Hagan could
have avoided liability entirely if he had simply notified Grand Met, the bidder,
and Dorsey & Whitney, his law firm, of his intention to trade. The Court’s
reasoning is that Mr. O’Hagan’s duty was not to maintain the confidentiality
of the information entrusted to him, but instead either to abstain from trading
or to disclose his intention to trade to the source of the information.122
The rather tortured logic that brings the Court to this odd result is
described in one of the more interesting footnotes in the annals of securities
regulation. This footnote, number 9 of the opinion, begins with the premise that
the element of fraud required to establish a violation of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act requires a showing of deception, and that the
“requirement of deception precludes § 10(b) liability when a person trading on
the basis of non-public information has disclosed his trading plans to, or
obtained authorization from, the principal.”123
Footnote 9 justifies its finding that an insider is entitled to a “get out of
jail free card” if she discloses her intention to trade before actually trading by
indicating that as soon as a disloyal agent discloses his imminent intention to
trade, her principal “may seek appropriate equitable relief under state law.”124
The “appropriate equitable relief” to which the Supreme Court refers in
footnote 9 is injunctive relief. After being notified by an insider trader of her
intent to trade, a corporation or law firm or other guardian of the confidentiality
of the information on which the insider wishes to trade can go to court and seek
an injunction barring the insider from trading.
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The “appropriate equitable relief” may not be sufficient relief for two
reasons. First, there is no requirement that the insider delay her trading after
disclosing her intention to trade until after the corporation has had an
opportunity to obtain an injunction. It is likely that in most cases an insider will
be able to disclose and trade before injunctive relief can be obtained. Second,
a corporation may be reluctant to seek equitable relief for fear of not being able
to maintain the confidentiality of the information in the hearing on the
injunction. While it may be possible to conduct the hearing in complete
confidence, there is no assurance that confidentiality can be successfully
maintained. Any third party observing the court proceeding or even learning
about it would be free to trade as long as she lacked a preexisting relationship
of trust and confidence with the source of the information. Moreover,
establishing the irreparable harm necessary to obtain an injunction would
require revealing the nature of the information, thereby thwarting the whole
object of the exercise: keeping the information from becoming reflected in the
share price of the company to which it pertains.
The point here is not that disclosure by insiders of material non-public
information should be categorically banned, as the SEC would like. Rather the
point is that, having determined that it is permissible for a corporation through
its agents to disclose material non-public information to traders when doing so
serves a legitimate corporate purpose, it is necessary to determine: (a) what
constitutes a legitimate corporate purpose that permits such disclosure and
trading, and (b) how the use of material non-public information should be
controlled as a matter of internal corporate governance of companies whose
shares are publicly traded.
The Supreme Court invented the personal benefit test in Dirks as the
tool to be used to make these determinations. If a tip of material non-public
information is done for no personal benefit, then, in the Court’s view, the tip:
(a) serves a legitimate corporate purpose (i.e. the tip is consistent with the
tipper’s fiduciary duties); and (b) the tipper gets to control the use of the
material non-public information, and is free to use the information to tip
professional traders, thereby enabling them to profit from the information.
The Court is correct that it should be permissible for a corporation
through its agents to disclose material non-public information to traders when
doing so serves a legitimate corporate purpose. But the personal benefit test is
a strange tool for determining what tipping and trading is legitimate and what
is not. Similarly, the “disclose or abstain” rule as articulated in O’Hagan is an
odd mechanism for controlling the disclosure of material non-public information. Insiders in possession of material non-public information should not
be able to legitimize their use of such information by disclosing their trading
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intentions before trading. Corporations with legitimate material non-public
information that they wish to keep confidential should not have to seek an
injunction to protect such information.
The personal benefit test should be replaced by a rule that allows
corporations to control the use of the information they have created. The issue
of whether it is permissible to tip material non-public information should
depend simply on whether such tipping is or is not consistent with the tippers’
fiduciary duties. While the receipt of a personal benefit may occasionally
provide some insight into the fiduciary duty analysis, the personal benefit test
should no longer be dispositive. For example, where the information in
question concerns a major fraud at a company, then there is no breach of
fiduciary duty for disclosing such information, regardless of whether the tipper
receives a pecuniary benefit from such disclosure.125
Further, where the person who engages in the tip is acting within the
scope of their employment and within areas of their discretion, tipping should
be permitted. Thus for example, where the Chief Financial Officer of a
corporation tips analysts in order to promote analyst coverage or when a
corporate communications officer briefs analysts in order to correct some
misunderstanding about a company’s operations or financial reporting, such
tipping should be presumptively permissible.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PERSONAL BENEFIT TEST AND
HOW TO IMPROVE IT
The analysis in this Article can be summarized in the following chart,
which also depicts the differences between the approach to tipping and trading
presented here and the contrasting approaches of the Court and the SEC:
TIPPEE LIABILITY
Tipping Correlated
or Caused by:
Pecuniary / NonPecuniary Benefit to
Tipper
125

Tippee Liability?
SEC / DOJ

Federal Courts

Yes

Yes

Efficiency
Yes
(unless tip involves
corporate fraud)

The receipt of a personal benefit might have relevance even in the case of tipping about
an ongoing corporate fraud. For example, the amount of the personal benefit should be
deducted from any whistleblower bounty the tipper may be entitled to receive.
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Relationship –
Intentional126
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Yes

Yes

Yes

No127

No

Yes

Mistake / Negligent
–Tip to Family
Member128

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mistake / Negligent
–Tip to Analyst129

Yes

No

Yes

Mistake / Negligent
–Tip to Stranger130

Yes

No

Yes

Legitimate Business
Purpose for Tip131

Yes

No
(unless
personal)

No
(even if personal)

As the chart indicates, the differences indicated by the current approach
arise in three contexts. First, the efficiency approach advocated here would lead
to a less strict application of insider trading laws in situations in which tipping
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or trading on the basis of inside information about corporate fraud. Currently,
such trading is illegal if the tipper receives any sort of personal benefit from
the tipping. Efficiency, which strongly favors ferreting out fraud, would
condone trading or tipping by those in possession of inside information about
a fraud even if they personally benefit by such trading or tipping.
Second, the efficiency approach advocated here leads to a stricter
application of insider trading laws in situations in which insider information is
disclosed by a tipper negligently, whether by accident or mistake. The approach
advocated here also will result in the application of Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions
on tipping and trading when done intentionally but without any personal benefit
inuring to the tipper. Such trading currently does not violate the law because the
personal benefit test forecloses liability in situations in which the tipper receives
no personal benefit. In contrast, the efficiency approach advocated here would
impose liability on tippers who negligently reveal material non-public information because of the fiduciary duty of care owed by insiders by virtue of their
relationship of trust and confidence with the company, and the strong economic
rationale for maintaining the confidentiality of legitimate, non-public information whose value to its creator will be destroyed if it is revealed before it can
be acted upon.
Finally, unlike current approaches, the efficiency approach advocated
here would not impose liability on those who disclose material non-public
information for a legitimate corporate purpose, even if they receive a personal
benefit for such disclosure.
CONCLUSION
In adopting the personal benefit test, the Court in Dirks essentially drew
a statistical inference about the correlation between the receipt of a personal
benefit by a tipper and the breach of fiduciary duty by the tipper. The personal
benefit test indicates that tipping for a personal benefit is perfectly correlated
with behavior that reflects the breach of one’s fiduciary duties, while tipping
without receiving a personal benefit is perfectly correlated with behavior that
is consistent with one’s fiduciary duties.
One implication of the analysis in this Article is that the correlation
between the receipt of a personal benefit and the breach of fiduciary duties is
far from perfect. A tipper who receives no personal benefit can nonetheless
harm the company that has entrusted her with material non-public information.
After all, if a tipper informs a perfect stranger of an impending tender offer for
another company that her company is on the verge of announcing without
receiving any attendant personal benefit, then under the personal benefit test
the insider would not have breached any fiduciary duty. On the other hand, if
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an insider passes along a tip about an ongoing fraud and does receive a personal
benefit, then such tipping is a crime, notwithstanding the fact that there is no
fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of an ongoing fraud and
notwithstanding the significant social benefits associated with uncovering
corporate fraud.
Current insider trading doctrine as reflected in the personal benefit test
is too lenient on insider trading in certain circumstances (i.e. where negligent
behavior leads to a tip by mistake) and too strict in other circumstances (i.e.
where the tip alerts the tippee to fraud). This Article sets the stage for a more
nuanced approach to insder trading law, one in which a personal benefit is
considered a possible symptom of punishable insider trading, instead of a
certain diagnosis.
The personal test, notwithstanding the flaws elucidated in this Article,
was a major advance in the application of economic theory to legal doctrine.
Specifically, the personal benefit test advances the theory enunciated in
Chiarella that material non-public information about a company is a valuable
asset in the form of intellectual property, and that, as such, the fundamental
purpose of insider trading law is to protect property rights in information.
Dirks is noteworthy for its recognition of the fact that protecting
property rights in information requires rules that do more than simply prohibit
the use of material non-public information by the “wrong people,” i.e. those
who have abused their positions of trust and confidence to purloin the
information from the company that created it. In addition to prohibiting the
wrong people from using material insider information, the law should enable
the “right people,” i.e. those who created the material non-public information
to profit from their discovery and development of such information.
The contribution of the personal benefit test developed in Dirks is that
it acknowledges not only the need to prohibit some trading on the basis of
material non-public information, but also the desirability, from a social welfare
perspective, of encouraging other trading motivated by such information. The
personal benefit test is based on the premise that those who reveal (tip) material
non-public information and the tippees who trade on that information, should
be punished if and only if their tips were motivated by venality in that they
were provided in exchange for a personal benefit. Those who tip such
information without receiving a personal benefit, together with their tippees,
should be permitted to trade under the personal benefit test because the test
specifies that only trading in which the tipper receives a personal benefit from
the tipper is illegal.
While the test often works well, as it did in Newman, it is far from
perfect. Socially undesirable trading such as that done by professional traders
on the basis of information that was mistakenly or accidentally revealed should
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be banned and those who negligently disclose such information should be
punished, at least civilly. Socially desirable trading, such as that done to reveal
an ongoing corporate fraud should be permitted, even where the person who
tips this information receives a personal benefit. Tippers should be allowed to
profit from revealing corporate fraud and other corporate malfeasance just as
whistleblowers are encouraged to seek bounties from the government in
exchange for their tipping.
The argument in favor of allowing tippers to profit from their tips by
trading is particularly strong in light of the evidence from events such as the
Madoff Ponzi scheme and the Equity Funding fraud described in this Article
indicating that whistleblowers often are ignored by regulators. Without the
ability to tip in exchange for a personal benefit, frauds can go undetected for
decades.

